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Abstract:
In this paper we propose to leverage remittances as an alternative source of finance for the
Cuban economy through one particular financial innovation—remittance securitization. This
instrument has been successfully used in a number of developing countries to mitigate the risks
associated with lending to a developing nation. We show how the structure of the remittance
securitization for the particular case of Cuba would also mitigate those risks and could
potentially allow Cuba to access capital markets at lower costs and longer terms than its
sovereign credit rating would otherwise allow.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Thousands of Cuban residents emigrate every year, mainly motivated by a combination of
economic and political factors. This has been a recurrent problem for Cuban authorities; who
have been unable to stop the emigration hemorrhage. To illustrate this issue, during 2016, it is
estimated that Cuba will have five emigrants for every thousand residents (CIA 2016). In the
U.S. alone, over 46,000 Cubans arrived during the first ten months of fiscal year 2016
(Krogstad 2016), adding to a population of Cuban origin in the U.S. of close to 2.1 million (see
“Hispanic or Latino by Specific Origin” 2016)—extremely high numbers considering that the
population in the island is 11.2 million people (see ONEI 2015).
Many of these men and women, after gaining employment in their new country, begin to send a
part of their earnings—either in the form of cash or goods—to their families and friends in
Cuba. These transfers sent from migrants to their countries of origin are known as
“remittances.”
In the case of Cuba, the extensive use of unofficial networks to send remittances, together with
a lack of data-collection by the government, makes it extremely complicated to estimate the
number of families receiving remittances, as well as the total amount of these inflows.
However, a number of studies using surveys (both within the island and abroad) and
econometric techniques provide estimations which will be reviewed in following sections.
Official estimates provided by José Luis Rodríguez, former Minister of Economy and Planning,
put the official estimate of the level of remittances at $1.7 billion, for 2014 (Rodríguez 2016).
While there is a migration crisis going on in the country, Cuba is also in desperate need of
sources of finance to escape the current economic crisis (more on this below) and to keep up
with the National Plan for Economic and Social Development through 2030 (see NPESD 2016)
and with the economic reforms contained in the Communist Party’s Guidelines for Economic
and Social Policy (simply Guidelines, hereafter) (GESP 2011; Monreal 2016b). These
documents introduced a series of sweeping economic and social reforms to revitalize the
economy, including massive lay-offs from the state sector, agricultural reforms, property law
reforms, and an expansion of private sector activities.
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According to a speech to the National Assembly, by Marino Murillo (Minister of Economy and
Planning, at the time) the scarcity of foreign currency creates a liquidity crisis, which is
principally the result of the fall in revenues from exports and the sudden, unexpected need to
finance imports, like oil, resulting from the economic and political crisis in Venezuela (Murillo
2016). He further noted the urgent need to find alternative ways to ease the resulting financial
constraints.
2016 Economic Recession
Much like the U.S. and other OECD countries, the Cuban economy has seen anemic growth in
the post-Great Recession world. As measured by its GDP growth, Cuba had a period of
extraordinarily rapid growth during the middle part of the first decade of the new millennium—
with an average 9 percent GDP growth rate from 2004 to 2007. However, as illustrated in
Figure 1 below, from 2008 to 2015 the average GDP growth stabilized at 2.7 percent—before
finally going turning negative by the end of 2016.
Figure 1. Annual Percentage Growth of Cuban Gross Domestic Product, 2000-2016.
(Constant 1997 prices)
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Source: Author’s elaboration from Cuba’s Office of National Statistics and Information data (ONEI
various years).

The macroeconomic precursors of the recession include a number of elements. The first cause
of the weakening of economic conditions since 2008 can be attributed to a considerable
2

slowdown of exports (Vidal 2012). Since 2008 the growth of exports fell from 11.6 percent per
year to -0.1 percent in 2015, at constant 1997 Cuban Pesos (CUP)1 (ONEI various years).
Additionally, there was an abrupt deterioration in the terms of trade, with declining prices of the
main commodity exports relative to imports (Vidal and González-Corzo 2010). Two exogenous
factors were of major importance during this period; the spillover effects of the Great Recession
and the devastation of large parts of the national territory by major hurricanes—e.g. Gustav,
Ike, Paloma, Matthew—with estimated damages worth up to US$14 billion (Vidal and
González-Corzo 2010; Peña de la Peña and Espinosa 2016).
Moreover, the Cuban economy experienced an internal financial crisis in 2008, in large part due
to scarcity of hard-currency and a convertibility crisis (Vidal and González-Corzo 2010).
According to Vidal and González-Corzo (2010) this crisis can be traced back to 2003, when the
currency board controlling the emission of the Cuban Convertible (CUC) was dissolved. With
no specific rules governing the emission of CUCs, the central bank exceeded the amount of
USD reserves backing up the CUC and maintaining their convertibility. The convertibility crisis
forced the government to impose capital controls, eventually freezing all foreign currency
payments due to the scarcity of foreign exchange reserves (Vidal 2012). All in all, the lack of
external financing during this period acted as a drag on the economy, with an estimated
contribution of negative 1 percent to GDP growth, from 2008 to 2013 (Vidal 2016).
An additional negative influence during this period was the collapse of the Venezuelan
economy, triggered by the fall in oil prices and the continuous political turmoil in that country.
As one of Cuba’s main trading partners, the economic problems in Venezuela have negatively
affected GDP growth in the island. The recent economic dependence on Venezuela resembles
that of the Soviet era, with commercial relations with Venezuela representing 15 percent of
Cuba’s GDP (Vidal 2016).
In the context of the elements mentioned above, since Raúl Castro was elected President in
2008 his administration has been characterized by tight controls over fiscal expenditures and
the implementation of economic reforms to reduce the role and size of the state in the economy.
To illustrate this point, during the period 2008-2015, total government expenditures as a percent
1

The Cuban Peso is one of two currencies issued by the Cuban government—the other one is the Cuban
Convertible (CUC). The exchange rate between the two is 24CUP:1CUC. The CUC can be exchanged for foreign
currencies; its value is fixed at 1:1 with the U.S. dollar (USD). We explain further in Chapter 4.
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of GDP were reduced by 14.7 percentage points (ONEI various years, chapter 5). Meanwhile,
from 2010 —when the Guidelines constituting the backbone of the reforms were finally
approved (GSEP 2011)—to 2015, government employment was reduced at a rate of 117,000
jobs a year; removing around 585,600 jobs from the economy in five years (ONEI various
years). According to Vidal (2012), the goal is to eventually reduce state employment by 20
percent, or around 1.3 million workers; it is assumed that those workers will be absorbed by the
private and cooperative sectors. By 2015, however, the private and cooperative sectors had
increased their ranks by 461,000 jobs, around 79 percent of the reduction in government
employment (ONEI various years). Thus the austerity policies of the current administration
contributed to the weakening of the economy, on top of the macroeconomic elements
mentioned above.
To fight the recession and stimulate the economy the government is planning to increase its
spending by 11 percent in 2017, according to the Cuban Minister of Finances and Prices
(Pedraza 2016). This increase in public spending, however, is not matched by expected
revenues. The mismatch is expected to be of around 11.5 billion Cuban pesos (CUP), which
Minister Pedraza (2016) estimates will create the largest fiscal deficit since 1993—around 12
percent of GDP. As in recent years, a portion of the fiscal deficit will be covered by the
emission of sovereign bonds in the national interbank market and the rest monetized.
External Debt Commitments
As a result of defaulting on its international hard-currency debt payments in 1986 (Domínguez
2004), Cuba faces serious difficulties funding in external finance markets. Until easy credits
from the Soviet Union dried up in the early 1990s, for many years that was not a problem.
Since then, Cuba has made efforts to renegotiate its outstanding debt and to resume servicing its
obligations in order to regain access to international finance. While U.S. restrictions are an
important limitation to restoring such access, President Castro has already taken steps to
improve the country’s creditworthiness; promising to honor the commitments resulting from
agreements reached during the renegotiation of Cuban debt with other governments and private
sector creditors (Castro 2015).
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Paris Club Creditors and Other External Debt
In recent years Cuba has successfully negotiated a number of deals to reduce its debt and have
more flexible payment terms with several countries—e.g. China, Japan, Mexico. Worthy of
mention is Russia’s forgiveness of 90 percent of Cuban debt to the former Soviet Union,
leaving Cuba with arrears of only $3.5 billion out of some $35 billion (Tanas and Andrianova
2014).
The Russian agreement paved the way for the deal with Paris Club’s Group of Creditors of
Cuba, in December 2015. By derogating the accumulated interests, the arrangements with the
Group of Creditors brought down the total stock of debt from $11.1 billion to $2.6 billion—the
original principal, to be paid over a period of 18 years (Paris Club 2017a). The first installment
was paid in October, 2016 for 1.6 percent of the $2.6 billion, amounting to some $41 million.
The percentage paid is set to gradually increase to 8.9 percent of the outstanding debt by 2033.
Moreover, the deal offers a grace period on interests through 2020, and then a 1.5 percent rate
of the outstanding debt.
The deal with the Paris Club has strategic implications that make it the most relevant of the debt
negotiations. The group’s permanent members are virtually all the most important economies of
the world; including the U.S., with which Cuba has long been at odds politically and in matters
of economic policy. The Group is also closely connected with international organizations with
which Cuba has broken ties—i.e. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)—but which play an important role in the world economy and international finances.
Other external debt
Luis (2016) estimates that Cuba owes around $10.6 billion to creditors other than the Paris
Club; among them to member banks of the Bank for International Settlements, suppliers,
defaulted bonds and loans, and the London Club. While the latest Cuban national statistics
show $11.9 billion of total external debt as of 2013 (ONEI 2015), as shown in Table 1 below.
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Table 1. External debt as recorded by the Office of National Statistics and Information, 20102013. (CUP millions)
Total (short and long term)
Official Debt

2010
6,671

2011
7,025

2012
7,432

2013
7,267

Bank Debt

2,388

2,530

2,793

2,021

Debt to Suppliers

4,516

4,361

2,307

2,627

Total

13,575

13,916

12,532

11,915

Source: Author’s elaboration from Office of National Statistics and Information data (ONEI 2015,
chapter 8).

During the early 2000s, the short-term high-interest fraction of the total foreign debt became a
heavy weight on state finances and the country accumulated a string of failures of repayment
and defaults. The failures to repay included not only debt to other governments but also to a
number of international suppliers, export financing agencies, and banks—from countries such
as France, Mexico, Japan, and Panama (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005). These recurrent
problems have been referred to as a “pattern of lack of repayment and defaults,” as indicated by
Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López, that “has greatly reduced Cuba’s ability to obtain fresh credits”
(2005, 40).
However, the recent negotiations and the restructuring of the outstanding debt show an
optimistic willingness of creditor countries and international institutions to open the door for
future credits and loans to Cuba. This is evident from the flexibilities offered by the Paris Club
negotiators, exempting Cuba from having “a current program supported by an appropriate
arrangement with the IMF,” which is one of the Paris Club’s prior conditions to negotiate
restructuring with debtor countries (Paris Club 2017b).
This suggests that Cuba is facing an international environment favorable to improving its
external creditworthiness. A number of factors will be of importance such as fulfilling current
debt service obligations on a timely manner. Indeed, as stated by the Paris Club, “failure to
fulfill debt obligations can rapidly damage creditworthiness” [emphasis added] (Paris Club
2017a).
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Economists, both national and foreign, offer a wide range of alternatives to the issues discussed
above. These include incorporating the country in the international and regional financial
institutions—e.g. the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American Development Bank—to leverage their
expertise and resources (see Feinberg 2011; Vidal and Brown 2015); accelerating meaningful
economic, administrative, and property law reforms to give a more prominent role to the market
and the private sector (see Mesa-Lago 2012, 2013; Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2013;
Castañeda 2013; Triana 2016); promoting new Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a pillar for
growth (see Hidalgo de los Santos 2016; Torres 2015), specially in the tourism sector (see
Rivalta and Rodríguez 2015); and relying on the usual combination of boosting exports while
substituting imports (Vidal and Fundora 2008).
The high levels of remittances from Cubans abroad have led some economists (e.g. Luis 2014;
Odriozola and Triana 2015; Monreal 2016a) to identify these transfers as a leading contributor
of net foreign currency for Cuba and to recognize the potential for active macroeconomic
policies to capture and utilize these flows. However, most do not appear to go further than
simple recognition. This present work intends to fill such gap in the literature by proposing to
leverage remittances as an alternative source of finance for the Cuban economy through one
particular financial innovation—remittance securitization. This instrument has been
successfully used in a number of developing countries, and could potentially allow Cuba to
borrow in capital markets at lower costs and longer terms than its sovereign credit ratings
would otherwise allow.
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CHAPTER 2: SECURITIZATION OF FUTURE-FLOW RECEIVABLES

The Cuban economy has had recurrent problems to secure external financing ever since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Moreover, most loans that Cuba receives are short term, high
interest rate loans (Pérez 2005). As a consequence, Cuba might have been operating in what
Minsky (1992) labeled a speculative position—if not Ponzi—with constant needs to rollover
debt and refinance commitments. As the Cuban economy continues to implement economic
reforms to bring about the so-called “updating” of the national economy, the feasibility and
potential of using novel ways to access global capital markets through innovative financing
policies should be evaluated and taken into consideration; for example, to maintain stable (if
not growing) investment for development or to secure the foreign exchange needed to keep
current with debt service payments to foreign creditors.
One such innovations in international finances, allowing developing countries to access global
capital markets on better terms, is the issuance of debt instruments backed by expected hard
currency receivables—i.e. securitization of future-flow receivables.
Definition and Background
Securitization can be defined as the process of creation and issuance of marketable financial
instruments whose payment of interest and principal, to investors, derive from cash flows
generated from an underlying asset or pool of assets. Typically, the financial assets underlying
the securities are loans—e.g. mortgages, credit card debt, student and auto loans—but, in
general, it can be any asset that generates a regular stream of future payments. The security,
then, offers investors a claim on those expected payments.
Securitization has been around for many years now. For example, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst
(2005) trace some forms of what today we call securitization to merchants and bankers in the
Netherlands of the 17th and 18th centuries, while White (2009) and Snowden (2010) show how
the securitization of residential and commercial mortgages was also used in the pre-Great
Depression U.S. of the 1920s. However, the phenomenon securitization has become in today’s
financial services industry finds its foundations in the mortgage market of the 1970s.
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The popularization of securitized instruments followed after the U.S. Congress deregulated the
financial system and relaxed Federal Reserve rules that allowed commercial banks to compete
with savings and loans institutions for deposits, amid rapidly rising demand for housing
finance, left the conventional primary funders of housing—the savings and loans associations—
with a funding shortfall, unable to meet the rapidly rising demand for housing finance (Kregel
2008, Kendall and Fishman 1996).
The instrument was popularized by the bond department at Salomon Brothers, headed by a
pioneer of modern securitization, Lewis Ranieri—who claims to have coined the term
securitization (Ranieri 1996, 31). The large profits quickly attracted the rest of the industry and
the markets for securitized debt surged to include a wide variety of assets, including those in
Table 2 below.
Table 2. Financial Assets Securitized Since the late 1970s.
●

Fixed- and Adjustable-rate mortgages

●

Equipment leases

●

Second mortgages

●

Export receivables

●

Home equity revolving lines of credit

●

Diversified payment rights

●

Auto loans

●

Remittances

●

Credit card receivables

●

Third world debt

●

Tax revenue receivables

●

Junk bonds

Source: Author’s elaboration (Kendall and Fishman 1996; Ketkar and Ratha 2009)

Following the definition offered at the beginning of this section, we can divide securitized
transactions in three general categories. First, those commonly known as “asset-backed
securities” (ABS), which refers to financial instruments providing investors the rights to collect
interests and principal payments generated by a pool of loans other than mortgage loans.
Securities backed by packing mortgage loans (residential and commercial), although technically
an ABS, are usually called “mortgage-backed securities” (MBS), which are categorized as a
second group. And a third group called “future-flow (backed) securities” (FFS), which refers to
those instruments allowing investors a claim over the revenues expected to be generated from
the originator’s normal course of operations.
9

Future-Flow Securitization
Financial institutions in developing countries have found convenient the securitization of a
wide variety of future-flow receivables. Since the first securitization transaction of this type,
Mexico’s Telmex securitization of telephone receivables in 1987, credit rating agencies have
rated over 400 transactions amounting to more than $80 billion (Ketkar and Ratha 2009).
Securities have found market placement backed-up by hard currency resulting from exports of
natural resources, minerals, and agricultural products; inflows of electronic and paper
remittances; diversified payment rights (DPR) flowing through the SWIFT2 system; and even
tax revenues (Ketkar and Ratha 2009).
Debt issuers from developing countries have found securitized instruments backed by hardcurrency receivables to be effective in breaking with the sovereign credit rating associated with
the host country. According to Ketkar and Ratha, the structure of a FFS mitigates the risk of
exposure to a developing country by “ensuring that the payments on the receivables do not
enter the issuer’s home country before the obligations to bond investors are met” (2009, 8). FFS
structures, then, allow debt issuers to borrow on better terms than what creditors would be
willing to offer under the sovereign rating of the developing country.
The Basic Structure of a Future-Flow Securitization
In order to ensure that the future payments on receivables do not enter the issuer’s home
country, an offshore Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is used as a conduit to issue the future-flow
backed notes that will yield principal and interest to investors. An SPV is a legal entity created
with a very specific mission, or for a narrowly limited set of activities or transactions. As
Gorton and Souleles explain, “SPVs have no purpose other than the transaction(s) for which
they were created, and they can make no substantive decisions; the rules governing them are set
down in advance and carefully circumscribe their activities” (Gorton and Souleles 2009, 550).
As illustrated in Figure 2 below, typical future-flow transaction in developing countries
involves a borrowing entity (or originator) giving up the rights to collect its future receivables
in favor of the offshore SPV in exchange for a discounted lump sum ‘today’. The SPV then

2

The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system is a global cooperative
providing secure financial messaging services.
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directs designated international customers (or obligors) to send payment for the originator’s
receivables directly to an offshore collection account ran by a trustee. The trustee collects the
receivables and allocates principal and interest payments to the investors. Any excess
collections after scheduled payments have been satisfied, are then redirected to the originator.
Figure 2. Structure of a Typical Future Remittance Flows Securitization.

Designated
Banks

Special Purpose
Vehicle

Remittance payments

Offshore Trust
(Collection
account)
Proceeds plus excess
collections (over
principal and interest)
Proceeds

Proceeds
plus excess
collection

Rights to collect
future remittance
payments from
designated banks

Principal and
interest
Investors
Offshore

Originator Bank

Source: Author’s elaboration based on Ketkar and Ratha (2009).

The Hierarchy of Collaterals:
The structure depicted above maintains the hard currency receivables out of the jurisdiction of
the government of the developing country, until bondholders have received principal and
interest payments. This is a key component of the FFS in these countries, because it means that
once the structure is set in place, capital and exchange controls imposed by sovereign
authorities upon currencies in which a debt is denominated—i.e. transfer and convertibility
risks—would not interfere with timely service of the debt (Fitch 2014). As Fitch Ratings
grading criteria states, “because note holders have access to payments on the receivables before
they return to the country in which the issuer is located, Fitch believes they will not be directly
subject to convertibility and transfer risks” (2015, 2).
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Credit rating agencies’ judgment that transfer and convertibility risks are mitigated, allows
originators to break with their sovereign credit ceiling, benefiting from obtaining financing at
better terms—i.e. for longer periods and at lower interest rates than they would have received
under unsecured debt—and even potentially accessing new investors limited to purchasing
investment-grade debt (S&P 2004).
While the structure of the securitized transaction reduces the transfer and convertibility risks
associated with lending to a developing country, these transactions are still vulnerable to
performance, price, and volume volatility. As its name indicate these risks arise from the
originator’s ability to continuously generate the future receipts, from the fluctuations in the
price of the good or service generating the future receipts, and from the volumes traded,
respectively. These risks are typically mitigated by excess coverage or overcollateralization
(Ketkar and Ratha 2009)—i.e. by issuing only a portion of expected remittance flows so that if
receipts fell short of expectations the transaction is not jeopardized.
However, the choice of the future receivable used as collateral also plays a major role in
alleviating performance and volume volatility risks. Based on the performance of past
securitizations, credit rating agencies have ranked the collaterals that best escape the risk
mentioned above, as indicated in Table 3 below. The securitization of future heavy crude oil
receivables is considered to be the least risky, while that of tax receipts is at the other end of the
spectrum.
Table 3. Hierarchy in Future-Flow-Backed Transactions.
1. Heavy crude oil receivables
2. Diversified payment rights, airline ticket receivables, telephone receivables, credit card
receivables, and electronic remittances
3. Oil and gas royalties and export receivables
4. Paper remittances
5. Tax revenue receivables
Source: Ketkar and Ratha (2009, 29: Table 2.1).
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Overall, the securitization of future-flow receivables in developing countries has a positive
track record and it has proven to be successful to both originators and investors (Ketkar and
Ratha 2009). Originators have benefited from lower costs of funds than what can be obtained
with the quality of rating of the originator, longer term funding, improved credit risk
management, and access to a broader investors base. While investors have been able to benefit
from more diversified portfolios and attractive investment opportunities with potential high
returns (Buchanan 2017). Indeed, as Ketkar and Ratha notice, “the attractiveness of future-flow
securities lies in … their stellar performance in good as well as bad times” (2009, 29).
Future Remittances as Collateral for Securitization
Individual remittances are usually not large sums of money, but when added together these
inflows amount to more than international aid and are more consistent than private capital
flows, as illustrated in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. Remittance Flows Are Larger than Official Development Assistance (ODA), and More
Stable than Private Capital Flows, 1990-2018.

Source: World Bank (2017, 2: Figure 1.1).

In Latin America in particular, where investors have long feared sovereign and political risk,
the securitization of remittances have become a useful, promising tool in reducing risk
(Buchanan 2017). In the region, remittances flows have been on the rise over the last five
13

years—to a record-high $68.3 billion, in 2015—and are thought to have increased by 6.9
percent over the course of 2016, as shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4. World Bank’s Estimates and Forecast for Remittance Flows to Developing Country
Regions, 2013-2018. (US$ billions)
Region
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017f
2018f
Developing Countries

426.4

444.3

439.8

429.3

443.6

459.1

East Asia and Pacific

114.3

122.7

127.3

125.8

129.0

132.7

Europe and Central Asia

54.6

51.7

40.3

38.4

41.0

43.6

Latin America and Caribbean

61.5

64.5

68.3

73.1

75.5

78.2

Middle-East and North Africa

50.5

54.4

51.1

48.8

51.8

53.5

South Asia

110.8

115.8

117.6

110.1

112.3

115.3

Sub-Saharan Africa

34.7

35.3

35.1

33.0

34.1

35.7

574.8

598.3

582.4

575.2

593.8

615.9

419.0

435.9

432.3

422.5

436.3

451.1

World
Low and Middle-Income Countries

Growth rate (percent)
Developing Countries

5.2

4.2

-1.0

-2.4

3.3

3.5

East Asia and Pacific

6.7

7.4

3.8

-1.2

2.5

2.9

Europe and Central Asia

17.1

-5.3

-22.1

-4.6

6.6

6.4

Latin America and Caribbean

2.1

4.8

6.0

6.9

3.3

3.6

Middle-East and North Africa

3.4

7.8

-6.1

-4.4

6.1

3.3

South Asia

2.6

4.5

1.6

-6.4

2.0

2.7

Sub-Saharan Africa

1.0

1.7

-0.4

-6.1

3.3

4.9

5.3

4.1

-2.7

-1.2

3.2

3.7

World
Source: World Bank (2017, 2: Table 1.1).

These figures underestimate the actual magnitudes of remittances flows because workers often
use unofficial channels and informal networks to send money back to their countries of origin,
which hinders the tracking of these flows. While only a few countries try to collect data to
measure the inflow of remittances through unofficial channels, the World Bank (2005) suggests
that if unofficial remittances were captured in the statistics, the total amount of recorded flows
could increase by at least 50 percent.
Additionally, remittance flows are also shown to be very stable and even countercyclical to the
economic situation in the receiving economy (Terry and Wilson 2005; Fajnzylber and López
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2008). While their altruistic character makes these flows responsive to unexpected factors that
affect the well-being of recipients; e.g. increasing the flows in times of national emergencies
and after natural disasters (Ketkar and Ratha 2009, 42-43).
Thus, it is not a surprise—given their stability, strength, and certainty—that one form of
securitization found to be increasingly reliable is the securitization of remittance flows. As
Hughes (2011, 104) reports, “rating agencies and practitioners note that remittance-backed
bonds tend to perform well.”
Table 5 below offers an overview of the top ten Latin American and Caribbean remittancereceiving countries for which the World Bank remittance database has data; some of which
have carried out successful remittance securitization transactions, as exemplified in the
following section.
Table 5. Top 10 Remittance-receiving countries in Latin America and Caribbean. (US$ billions)
2015

2016e

Remittances as a share of GDP in
2015 (percent)

1. Mexico

26.2

28.5

2.3

2. Guatemala

6.6

7.4

10.3

5.2

5.5

7.7

4.7

4.9

1.6

5. El Salvador

4.3

4.6

16.6

6. Honduras

3.7

3.8

18.2

7. Brazil

2.9

2.7

0.2

8. Peru

2.7

2.9

1.4

9. Ecuador

2.4

2.7

2.4

10. Jamaica

2.4

2.4

16.9

Country

3. Dominican
Republic
4. Colombia

Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank data (see “Migration and Remittances” 2017).

Accessing External Financing through Remittance Securitization
As argued above, because the structure of the securitization maintains the hard-currency
receivables outside the developing country, it mitigates the transfer, convertibility risks and
potentially allows for credit ratings above the sovereign’s. Box 2 below shows an example of a
successful remittance securitization transaction by Banco do Brasil. Indeed, through the
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securitization of future remittances Banco do Brasil was able to improve its creditworthiness
and obtain financing with a better credit rating than otherwise international capital markets
would have allowed (Ketkar and Ratha 2009). Moreover, World Bank economist Dilip Ratha
argues that because the securitization creates a financial relation between the borrowing country
and international creditors, it establishes a credit history that “enhance the ability and reduce the
costs of accessing capital markets in the future” (2005, 3).
Institutions in other developing countries have also been able to borrow at lower spreads using
remittances as collateral. The popularity of this tool grew rapidly since the first major
securitization of this type was done in Mexico in 1994. For example, Mexico, Turkey, and El
Salvador alone borrowed around $2.3 billion, from 1994 to 2000, using this instrument (Ratha
2005). Similar to Banco do Brasil’s example, when El Salvador’s Banco Cuscatlán borrowed
$50 million in 1998 the transaction was rated above the sovereign rating—BBB and BB,
respectively (Ratha 2005).
Table 6. Remittance-Backed Future-Flow Transactions are Rated Higher than the Sovereign.
Year

Issuer

US$ million

Flow

Transaction
rating

Sovereign
rating

1998

Banco Cuscatlán

50

Remittances

BBB

BB

2002

Banco do Brasil

250

Remittances

BBB+

BB-

2004

Banco Salvadoreño

25

BBB

BB+

DPR (including
remittances)

Source: Ratha (2005, 3: Table 2).
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Box 1. Banco do Brasil’s (BdB) Nikkei Remittance Trust Securitization
Amount: US$250 million. Collateral: U.S. dollar or Japanese yen–denominated worker remittances.
Transaction rating BBB+ versus BdB’s and Brazil’s local currency rating of BB+/Stable and foreign
currency rating of BB-/Stable.
This deal involved Banco do Brasil selling its future remittance receivables from Brazilian workers in
Japan directly or indirectly to a Cayman Island–based offshore SPV named Nikkei Remittance Rights
Finance Company. A New York City–based SPV issued and sold the debt instrument to investors,
receiving US$250 million. BdB Japan was directed to transfer remittances directly to the collection
account managed by the New York–based trust. The collection agent was to make principal and interest
payments to the investors. Excess collections were to be directed to the originator BdB via the SPV.
Since remittances did not enter Brazil, the rating agencies believed that the structure mitigated the usual
sovereign transfer and convertibility risks. The structure also mitigated the bankruptcy risk because the
SPV had no other creditors and hence could not go bankrupt. Of course, the risk of BdB going bankrupt
existed, but such risk was minimal given the government-owned BdB’s dominant position in Brazil.
Furthermore, legal opinion held that creditors would continue to have access to the pledged security
(that is, remittances) even if BdB were to file a bankruptcy petition.
However, a number of residual risks remained, and they were difficult to structure away. These
included the performance risk—the ability and willingness of BdB to garner remittances and deliver
them to the collection account managed by the New York–based trustee; the product risk—the ability
and willingness of Japan to generate remittances; and the diversion risk—the possibility of BdB selling
the remittance rights to another party. The performance risk is generally captured in the issuer’s local
currency rating. For entities such as banks, Fitch Ratings uses the going concern and Standard & Poor’s
uses the survival assessment of the originating entity in rating an asset-backed transaction higher than
the issuer’s local currency rating. This was the case for the BdB’s Nikkei Remittance Trust transaction,
which was rated BBB+ by Standard & Poor’s, whereas BdB had a BB+ local rating. In reaching this
decision, Standard & Poor’s took into account (1) BdB’s position as the largest financial institution in
Brazil (with a 2,900-strong branch network), which makes it the most natural conduit for funds
transfers, (2) the long-established presence of BdB in Japan since 1972, and (3) the importance of
worker remittances in generating foreign exchange for the Brazilian government.

(Box continues in the following page)
17

Structure of Bdb Remittance Securitization

Banco do Brasil,
Japan

Remittance payments
via consent agreement

New York City-based
trust

Proceeds of $250 million

Cayman Island-based
SPV: Nikkei
Remittance Rights
Finance Company

$250 million
+ excess
collateral

Excess collection
Principal and
interest

Proceeds of
$250 million

Collection rights

Investors

Banco do Brasil

Source: Standard & Poor’s 2002 (as cited in Ketkar and Ratha 2009).

The product risk from volatility and seasonal fluctuations in remittances was mitigated via
overcollateralization or excess coverage, with a debt service coverage ratio of 7.64x. Another element of
the product risk was partially mitigated by recognizing Japan’s need for workers to supplement the native
workforce, and the availability of Brazilians of Japanese descent to fill this demand. Standard & Poor’s,
however, recognized as constraints on the rating the possibilities of Japan obtaining workers from countries
other than Brazil, and of BdB selling remittance rights to another party. It expressly identified the latter as
an event of default, triggering early amortization.
Some elements of the sovereign risk also cannot be totally eliminated. For example, Banco Central do
Brasil can compel BdB to pay remittances directly to the central bank instead of the trust. A degree of
protection against this risk is provided by the fact that BdB is majority owned by the government of Brazil.
In other instances, remittance securitized transactions have made designated correspondent banks sign a
Notice and Acknowledgement, binding under U.S. law (or the law of a highly rated country), that they will
make payments to the offshore trust. That would make the sovereign reluctant to take the drastic step of
requiring payments into the central bank. Currency devaluation is yet another element of sovereign risk that
cannot be totally eliminated, even in structured transactions. For instance, currency devaluation may affect
the size and timing of remittances, particularly through formal channels.
Source: Ketkar and Ratha (2009, 40-42: Box 2.2).
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CHAPTER 3: REMITTANCES IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY

For many years the Cuban government enjoyed economic benefits from its political allegiance
with the Soviet Union and other former communist countries. During those years Cuba enjoyed
a windfall of investment programs and development projects, based on credits at preferential
terms and development aid (Pérez Villanueva 2001).
This beneficial juncture ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and with it the
easy access to credits, external markets, and other sources of financing. The disappearance of
the Soviet Union and the termination of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance had
severe consequences for the Cuban economy; starting with the loss of price subsidies and soft
loans estimated to have amounted to some $65 billion in the period 1960-1990 (Mesa-Lago and
Pérez-López 2005).
Moreover, because Soviet countries were Cuba’s main trading partners, foreign trade collapsed
by 75 percent; and the foreign demand for exports of nickel, cigars, and citrus and the imports
of consumer, intermediate, and capital goods all virtually disappeared (Mesa-Lago and PérezLópez 2005)—as well as the subsidized barter of oil for sugar at below world market prices. All
in all the Cuban economy lost 35 percent of its GDP in the first four years of 1990s decade
(Hernández Roque and Ramos Hernández 2012). As a consequence, the Cuban government was
forced to rethink the conditions and strategies for development and to reinvent its way of
insertion in the world economy.
In the aftermath of the disappearance of the communist bloc and the subsequent collapse of the
Cuban economy remittances became of vital economic importance for Cuba. In the early years
of the so-called “special period”3 a number of policy measures opened the doors to the receipt
and use of U.S. dollars. Immediately after, remittance inflows surged and remittances became
one of the main sources of income for Cubans and of hard currency for the country. Box 1
below offers an overview of the set of economic and social adjustment policies implemented

3

A period of deep economic depression begging in the early 1990s with the one-third contraction of GDP and with
no specific period-end date.
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through the 1990s. While the following sections review some of the policies put in place by the
Cuban government to capture remittances.
Box 2. Economic and Social Transformations in Cuba in the 1990s














Decriminalization of the holding of foreign currency
Opening to foreign investment
Geographical reorientation and decentralization of foreign trade
Extension of self-employment
Expansion of cooperatives in farming
Resizing and restructuring of state enterprises
Institutional and regulatory reorganization of central state administrative agencies
Economic and financial reform
New salary scales for the labor force
Opening of farmer’s market
Opening of markets for small-scale industrial and craft goods
Decentralization of decision-making and greater autonomy at the territorial level for policy
implementation
New social programs launched

Source: Togores and García (2004, 248: Box 8.1).

These measures, while transformative of some institutions and structures in the economy, did
not substantially change the economic and, more importantly, the political model. Instead they
offered a gradual update of a system that remained essentially managed by central planning and
with state ownership over virtually all means of production. As it would be the case almost
twenty years later, the 1990s process of reforms was neither a complete overhaul of the system
nor a return to capitalism, but merely a modernization of its management.
Cuban Policies on Remittances
As mentioned above, up until the 1990s remittances had a very limited impact in the Cuban
economy. In fact, before the 1990s the official government policy was to discourage any sort of
collaboration and communication between Cubans in the island and Cubans abroad—including
the transfer of remittances. It wasn’t until the government had to deal with the economic
collapse that followed the disappearance of the Soviet Union that they started looking for new
sources of foreign currency—which they found mainly in the tourism sector and remittances.
At that point, as Fidel Castro explained in an interview, the government decided that it was
necessary not only to “legitimize, but to ensure that [the Cuban government] captures a
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percentage … of these dollars, so … they can be used to benefit the population as a whole” (as
quoted in Barberia 2004, 366).
The official policies on remittances, during the 1990s, can be seen in three waves of reforms to
direct the inflows into the official economy. The first set of policies included the decriminalization of foreign currency possession and allowing Cuban nationals to open bank
accounts in foreign currency. Soon after there was a partial dollarization of the economy, during
which the USD became unit of account and means of payments in the economy—meaning that
Cuban citizens could use American dollars for their purchases even in state-owned stores. And
later the Central Bank introduced a new currency called the Cuban Convertible (CUC), which
exchanges at par with the USD—except cash exchanges, which carry a 10 percent surcharge—
and eventually replaced the need for dollars in commercial transactions. It would also make
sure that most dollars were retired from circulation, surrendered to the government in exchange
for CUCs.
The banking system also underwent several transformations, developing the infrastructure to
improve and expand banking services and to guarantee more rapid, transparent transaction in
foreign currency. This included the creation of new banks, installation of ATMs, authorizing of
the use of postal service to send remittances, and the use of some credit and debit cards in the
island.
Official Remittance Transfer Channels
The package of reforms during the 1990s included a number of measures to improve Cuba’s
financial infrastructure, to open more the economy to rest of the world, and to promote the use
of official remittance channels. As a result Cuba now presents a number of choices to remit
money through banks and non-bank financial institutions. Barberia (2004, 379-386) offers a
thorough description of six channels comprising the official remittance transfer system
operating in Cuba, which we summarize below.
1. There are a number of international banks—from European, North American, and Latin
American countries—that regularly wire funds in partnership with the Cuban banking
system. The banks emitting the transfer normally charge a fee, while the Cuban
counterpart charges a commission on the transaction. For example, Cuba’s Banco
21

Popular de Ahorro advertises this type of arrangements with over a dozen
correspondent banks, through which remittances can be sent from all over the world in
foreign currencies like Euro, Canadian Dollar, and Pound sterling (BPA 2017). Some of
these banks are listed in Appendix B.
2. Money transmitters or remittance forwarding agencies also operate to send money
directly to Cuba—e.g. Western Union. These services are widely used in the U.S.-Cuba
remittance corridor because the financial sanctions imposed on the island by the
Embargo limit American banks participation (more on this below). As far back as 2008,
González-Corzo and Larson (2008) had already identified at least 88 authorized
remittance forwarding agencies in the U.S. Since around two-thirds of remittance
recipients in Cuba receive their money from the U.S. (Hansing and Orozco 2014), these
money transmitters and forwarding agencies encompass the majority of official
remittances.
3. Remittances can also be sent directly to a debit card of a Cuban recipient, a service
operated in partnership with a foreign corporation. This option was first established in
coordination with a Canadian corporation, through which remitters could send money
from any country in the world—including the U.S.—to a Canadian bank account that
then transmitted the funds to the Cuban recipient’s debit card. This service was later
extended to allow electronic transfers from various European countries.
4.

Couriers services—e.g. DHL—also carry remittances to the island; although this option
carries the least competitive prices.

5. Family members living abroad can pay the outstanding balances on credit cards that can
be used by their relatives in the island. To this end, even major credit card companies
have found ways around the Embargo; including Visa and MasterCard.
6. Remittances can be sent electronically in the form of postal money orders from a
number of Latin American and European countries that have entered agreements with
the Cuban postal service (Correos de Cuba).
While these official channels are commonly used by remitters, a share of around half of total
remittances remains transferred through non-official channels (Orozco 2009; Hansing and
Orozco 2014).
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U.S. Controls and Limitations on Remittance Flows
From a sending-country perspective, remittance outflows are sometimes thought to have a
negative impact on economic activity because they represent a leak of resources that could be
used for domestic consumption and investment (Alkhathlan 2013; Baas and Melzer 20124).
However, remitter countries rarely impose direct restrictions over these outflows (Barberia
2004); the particular case of the U.S.-Cuba remittances corridor being one of those exemptions.
The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has imposed tight restrictions on the transfer of
remittances since the early 1960s. By restricting the access to foreign currency, it was thought,
the new Revolutionary government would not be able to command the resources to realize the
promise of a prosperous Communist economy and society. The U.S. strategy was to suffocate
the Cuban Revolution financially; creating enough economic hardship that discontent among
the people would bring about the collapse of a potential Communist regime only ninety miles
from U.S. soil.
To that end, in 1963 the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) reinforcing a sanctions-based policy
towards Cuba. This policy outlawed any transfer of property, including cash. As Barberia sums
it,
CACR regulations prohibited U.S. citizens, residents, and corporations from engaging
in “(1) all transfers of credit and all payments…; (2) all transactions in foreign
exchange by any person within the United States; and, (3) the exportation or
withdrawal from the United States of gold or silver coin or bullion, currency or
securities by any person within the United States” with Cuba and its nationals. (2004,
389)
These prohibitions were relaxed during the Carter Administration, allowing sending remittances
legally through a number of authorized remittance forwarders and banks. The thaw, however,
required that remittance transfers to be either “hand-carried” or sent to a third country, from
where the Cuban institutions could then access the funds (Barberia 2004, 390).
4

Although Baas and Melzer (2012) present the argument that remittance outflows could harm the domestic
economy, their results contradict such hypothesis.
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The timid rapprochement of bilateral relations under President Carter was reversed during the
following two republican administrations and the Clinton presidency; tightening the sanctionsbased approach and eventually ban remittances altogether. Three important elements combined
during this period change the course set out by Carter. One is that, as Barberia put it, “as the
economic impact of the collapse of trade and aid with the Soviet Union hit Cuba, U.S. policy
sought to reinforce these impacts by furthering economic sanctions to speed Castro’s demise”
(2005, 392). While the other two were the balseros5 crisis of August 1994 and the 1996
shootdown, by Cuban the Air Force, of two civilian aircrafts operated by Miami-based antiCastro organization Brothers to the Rescue.
These two incidents elevated diplomatic tensions between the two countries to close to its
Missile Crisis high and U.S. legislators’ response included a four-year ban on remittances to
Cuba (Barberia 2005). However, by the end of the decade there was another policy shift toward
loosening restrictions on remittances transfers. Overall, and on top of controls and regulations,
remittance forwarding services from the U.S. had increased from 31 in 1992 to 126 by the end
of George W. Bush’s first term (Barberia 2005). Nevertheless, President Bush, in good rapport
with Cuban-American hardliners, imposed new sanctions restricting remittances to be sent only
to remitter’s immediate family members (Sullivan 2012).
American policy toward Cuba had a major shift under President Obama’s administration. By
the time his second term was over, President Obama had implemented a number of measures
that effectively loosened the U.S. embargo and promoted a policy of engagement with Cuba.
The regulatory changes included OFAC increasing the amount of money that could be sent by
any U.S. person to a nonfamily Cuban national; lifting all restrictions on family remittances;
and allowing larger amounts to be carried by authorized travelers (Sullivan 2017). Box 2 below
offers an overview of the current U.S. policy on remittances to Cuba.
At this point we can only speculate about President Trump’s policy toward Cuba and on his
Administration’s stand on restrictions on remittances. However, during the electoral campaign
President Trump expressed that he would reverse President Obama’s policy of engagement,
unless Cuba is willing to “make a better deal” (Trump 2016). At the time of this writing the
5

Balseros (rafters) is the name given to Cubans that leave the island illegally on rafts, trying to reach the U.S.
coasts. During the summer of 1994 thousands of Cubans took to the sea in rafts on a massive exodus to escape the
economic depression in the country.
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Administration maintains that it is in “the midst of a full review of all U.S. policies towards
Cuba” (Spicer 2017).
Box 3. Current U.S. Policy on Remittances to Cuba
U.S. restrictions on remittances to Cuba have been regulated by the CACR [Cuban Assets Control
Regulations] and, just like restrictions on travel, have changed over time. Since 2009, the Obama
Administration has significantly eased restrictions on remittances. In 2009, the President lifted all
restrictions on family remittances. In 2011, the Administration restored a general license category for
so-called nonfamily remittances (for up to $500 per quarter) and created a general license for
remittances to religious institutions in Cuba in support of religious activities.
In January 2015, as part of the President’s policy shift on Cuba, OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets
Control] increased the amount allowed for nonfamily remittances (referred to as periodic remittances to
Cuban nationals) to $2,000 per quarter; increased the amount of remittances that authorized travelers
were permitted to carry to Cuba to $10,000, up from the previous limit of $3,000; and created a general
license for certain remittances for humanitarian projects, support for the Cuban people, and support for
the development of private businesses. In September 2015, OFAC removed the cap altogether on
nonfamily remittances, referring to them in the amended regulations as “donative remittances to Cuban
nationals.” OFAC also removed the cap on the amount that licensed travelers may carry to Cuba.
Among the CACR’s current provisions on remittances are the following:


Family Remittances. Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States who are 18 years
of age or older are authorized to send remittances to close relatives in Cuba (31 C.F.R.
515.570(a)). There is no limit on the amount or frequency of the remittances. As with the
travel-related transactions, a close relative is defined as any individual related to the remitter by
blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from the remitter
or from a common ancestor with the remitter (31 C.F.R. 515.339). The recipient of the
remittances cannot be a prohibited official of the Cuban government (defined in 31 C.F.R.
515.337) or a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party (defined in 31 C.F.R.
515.338).
(Box continues in the following page)
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Donative Remittances to Cuban Nationals. Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States are authorized to send periodic remittances (31 C.F.R. 515.570(b)), and there is no limit
on the amount or frequency of the remittances. The recipient of the remittances cannot be a
prohibited official of the Cuban government (defined in 31 C.F.R. 515.337) or a prohibited
member of the Cuban Communist Party (defined in 31 C.F.R. 515.338).



Remittances to Religious Organizations. Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States are authorized to send remittances to religious organizations in Cuba in support of
religious activities (31 C.F.R. 515.570(c)).



Remittances to U.S. Students in Cuba. Remittances are authorized to send to close relatives
in Cuba who are students involved in licensed educational activities (31 C.F.R. 515.570(d)).



Emigration-Related Remittances. Two one-time $1,000 emigration-related remittances are
authorized (31 C.F.R. 515.570(e)).



Remittances to Certain Individuals and Independent Nongovernmental Organizations in
Cuba. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may send remittances to individuals and independent
nongovernmental entities in Cuba, including pro-democracy groups and civil society groups,
and to members of such organizations in order to support humanitarian projects designed to
directly benefit the Cuban people; activities of recognized human rights organizations,
independent organizations designed to promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, and
individuals and NGOs that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in
Cuba; and the development of private businesses, including small farms (31 C.F.R.
515.570(g)(1)).



Carrying of Remittances to Cuba. Authorized travelers to Cuba may carry authorized
remittances to Cuba (31 C.F.R. 515.560(c)(4)(i)), and no limit is indicated. Emigration-related
remittances may not be carried to Cuba unless a U.S. immigration visa has been issued for the
recipient and the licensed traveler can produce certain information regarding the recipient.

Source: Excerpt from Sullivan (2017, 14-15).

Remittances and Inequality in the Cuban Economy
As mentioned above, a number of economic, financial, and social reforms were introduced
during the 1990s to fight the depression triggered by the disappearance of the Soviet Union and
to revitalize the economic system. These reforms, aiming to stimulate the economy, generated
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what Cuban sociologist Mayra Espina (2008) calls a process of “social re-stratification,” which
jeopardized decades of advances in matters of social equity. Indeed, even though the Cuban
government does not publish statistics on income distribution, Cuban scholars have estimated a
Gini coefficient increase of 19 Gini points; going from 0.22 to 0.41 from 1986 to 1999—
worsening by 86 percent (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005; Monreal 2017).
Moreover, since the disappearance of the Soviet bloc to the end of the 1990s, the average real
wage for Cubans in the state sector dramatically declined—estimates of the decline vary from
39 (ECLAC 2000, as cited in Mesa-Lago 2001) to 44 percent (Togores 1999). Not only were
real wages falling for workers in the state sector, they were also deteriorating vis-à-vis workers
in the private sector and informal economy. Indeed, as Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López put it
(citing Carranza, Gutierrez, and Monreal 1995), in 1994 “the lowest-income worker in the
informal sector earned in one day the equivalent of the average monthly wage of a state worker”
[emphases added] (2005, 73).
The social re-stratification process as well as the rising income gaps and distinctions between
have and have-nots are to a great extent a reflection of access to remittances (Espina 2003,
2008; Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005; and Monreal 2017). In fact, 63 percent of the families
in the highest income bracket are remittance-receivers, while these transfers extend to only 5
percent of those in the lowest end of the income distribution (Iñiguez, Ravenet, and Pérez
Villanueva 2001, as cited in Espina 2003).
Starting in 2011—when the so-called Guidelines (GSEP 2011) were put forward—it has been a
major policy shift to allow the private sector to play a more relevant role in the economy.
However, while in theory almost anyone can now start their own small business, the reality is
that access to remittances is one of few sources of financing for the new start ups. Small private
businesses currently find remittances functioning as a substitute for credits and loans in the
absence of a developed financial sector (Hansing and Orozco 2014)—a similar role that
remittances play in other financially-underdeveloped countries with liquidity constraints
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2005). In the words of Alejandro de la Fuente, director of the AfroLatin American Research Institute at Harvard University, “now the remittances are being used
to fund or establish private companies, that is, not just to fund consumption, as in the past” (as
quoted in Archibold 2015). Then, whether (or not) a person receives remittances can be a major
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determinant of the access to opportunities for wealth accumulation, leaving behind the share of
the population that does not receive this kind of transfers.
Cuban emigration historically has been predominantly white, to such degree that this racial
group is over twice more likely than blacks and mulattos to be remittance-receivers (Blue 2004,
2007). Indeed, Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López argue that “an estimated 84 [percent] of Cuban
émigrés residing abroad are white, while at least 34 [percent] of the island’s residents are black.
Because of this imbalance, blacks receive an estimated one-third of the level of remittances
received by whites” (2005, 98). This disproportion leaves nonwhite Cubans in clear
disadvantage vis-à-vis white families, in terms of income, wealth accumulation, and
opportunities for upward mobility.
The groups that have been left behind by since the 1990s—i.e. state sector workers and nonremittance receivers—find it almost impossible to insert themselves in the emerging private
sector economy and to take advantage of the opportunities that the new market-oriented reforms
offer. This has the potential to become an intergenerational inequality problem in the Cuban
society.
Remittances to Cuba: A Survey of Estimates
The official Cuban balance of payments statistics do not offer a breakdown of the components
of current transfers nor do they publish a series of remittance estimates. The lack of available
data together with the extensive use of informal channels to deliver remittances to Cuba makes
it extremely hard to precisely estimate the amounts sent (Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López 2005).
However, while there is a big cloud of uncertainty around the actual amount of remittance
flowing to Cuba every year, there are a number of estimates that offer a good idea. In this
section we review recent estimates in order to derive an order of magnitude for estimating the
funds that could be raised through remittance securitization, in following chapters.
Mesa-Lago and Pérez-López (2005) offer comprehensive review of remittance estimates for the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Their compilation of studies, including both Cuban researchers and
foreign scholars, suggest that the value of yearly remittances ranged from $300 to $700 million
from 1995 to 1999, increasing to between $800 million and $1.1 billion by 2003 (2005, 77).
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Later on, González-Corzo and Larson (2008) argue that, from 2001 to 2006, remittances to
Cuba increased by 27.5 percent; going from an estimated $730 million to $931 million in 2006.
At that time remittances represented close to 34 percent of the value of exports and around 44
percent of receipts generated by tourism. Similarly, researchers from the U.N. Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimate total remittances to be
around $1.0 billion a year, in 2005 (Molina 2005). While Morales (2010) argues that around 70
percent of Cuban households receive some form of remittances, which he estimates amounted
to close to $1.4 billion in 2008.
As noted above, the former head of the Ministry of the Economy and Planning, José Luis
Rodríguez, put the official estimate of the level of remittances for 2014 at $1.7 billion
(Rodríguez 2016). This amount seems in line with the results from a number of surveys carried
out in Cuba by researchers from the Inter-American Dialogue, estimating remittances of $1.3
billion for 2015 (Orozco, Porras, and Yansura 2016).
More recently, an independent poll conducted in Cuba by Miami-based firm Bendixen &
Amandi indicates that around one-third of Cubans receive money from a family member abroad
(Bendixen & Amandi 2015a). The survey, which was designed to be representative of the
whole adult population in the country (Bendixen and Amandi 2015b), shows that more than 3
million Cuban adults receive payments from abroad, averaging around $1000, for a total of $3
billion in remittances every year. Indeed, analysts at The Havana Consulting Group estimate the
total amount of remittances to be as high as $3.3 billion (Morales 2016), while the U.S.
Department of State provides an estimate amounting to some $3 billion from the U.S. alone, in
2015 (U.S. Department of State 2016).
Remittances are expected to have increased in 2015 and 2016 because of a series of measures
announced and implemented by the Obama administration to normalize, as much as possible
through executive powers, U.S.-Cuba relations. Among the new measures was increasing the
limit of remittances that Cuban-Americans could send to Cuba. As a result of Obama’s actions
some analysts expect as much as a doubling in the amount of remittances sent to the island
(Morales 2016).
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Policy Recommendations

Financial Institutions to Structure the Remittance Securitization
The economic and financial reforms of the 1990s included the creation of a number of
commercial banks to complement the activities of the central bank. Among the newly created
institutions was the Banco de Inversiones S.A., founded in 1996 responding to a demand for
investment banking services.
The securitization operation can be structured under current law by Banco de Inversiones. The
license granted by the Banco Central de Cuba’s Resolution No. 45/2015 (BCC 2015)
authorizes Banco de Inversiones to offer services such as financial engineering, asset
securitization, and the emission and trade of debt instruments on behalf of third parties. To
exercise these activities, among other, the Resolution allows the investment bank to act as an
agent for structuring, registering, paying interest, redeeming, exchanging, and emitting bonds
and other securities.
Moreover, under current law, Banco de Inversiones can sign contracts and establish agency
agreements with national as well as foreign banks (2015, 634). This is important to notice
because, as explained in the previous chapter, the remittance securitization requires the
originator bank to establish a contract overseas ceding its rights to collect payments on the
future receivables.
SWIFT and Money Transfer Operators
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) system is a global cooperative providing secure financial
messaging services. SWIFT connects over 11,000 financial-institution members across more
than 200 countries (see “Introduction to SWIFT” 2017). All nine Cuban commercial banks
operate payments with the SWIFT systems and already receive transfers (including remittances)
from a number of correspondent international banks—mainly European. Appendix B illustrates
the Cuban banking system by listing national and foreign institutions licensed by the central
bank to operate in Cuba, both bank and non-bank. It is important to notice that diversified
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payment rights flowing through the SWIFT international network have been securitized since
the early 2000s—including workers’ remittances (Ketkar and Ratha 2009).
Moreover, there are a number of foreign banks with representation offices in Cuba, as well as
international non-bank financial institutions, authorized by the Cuban government for the
purpose of sending remittances to the island; including U.S.-based Western Union and Caribe
Express. The latter even advertises to remitters the option of sending money through Cuba’s
Banco Financiero Internacional, Banco Popular, or Banco Metropolitano (Caribe Express
2017).
In short, the Cuban financial system is already directly linked to international institutions and
capital markets. Thus, there is already a basic financial infrastructure in place from which the
remittance securitization transaction can be constructed.
Estimate of a Potential Remittance-Backed Transaction
For the purpose of offering estimations of potential funds to be raised from securitizing
remittances we will make a conservative estimate, in line with those reviewed in Chapter 2 and
in line with the yearly amounts flowing to other countries in the area with similar characteristics
to Cuba—regarding population and diasporas.
We are going to work with an ad hoc estimate of $2.0 billion a year. This number is within the
range of the estimates reviewed earlier and it is also in line compared to Cuba’s international
neighbors. In fact, and only considering the emigration to the U.S., all the countries with over a
million of its people in the U.S. (see table 7 below) have remittance inflows over $4 billion a
year (from table above: Top 10 Remittance-receiving countries). While emigrants from those
countries find other places of residence—other than the U.S.—there is no doubt that the U.S. is
the principal destination and where the largest share of their emigrant population reside
(Migration Policy Institute 2017b).
A good example is Dominican Republic, a country with characteristics similar to Cuba in terms
of overall population and emigration to the U.S. Dominicans around the world remit more than
$5 billion a year, as shown in Table 5 above. Particularly, the Dominican diaspora in the U.S.
transferred about $3.8 billion in remittances in 2015, over 70 percent of the total 2015
remittances. Meanwhile countries like El Salvador and Guatemala receive virtually all
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remittances from the U.S.; $4 and $6 billion, respectively (Migration Policy Institute 2017a).
Likewise, the U.S. is the Mecca of Cuban emigration. Even when many people leave the island
heading to other countries, usually their intention is to merely use the third country as a bridge
on their way to the U.S. Indeed, a recent report from the D.C. based Inter-American Dialogue
suggest that the U.S. was the destination of around 77 percent of Cuban émigrés, from 2010 to
2015 (Orozco, Porras, and Yansura 2016). While a 2012-2013 survey finds that around 68
percent of remittance recipients received money from the U.S. (Hansing and Orozco 2014).
Thus, compared to other countries of the area the $2.0 billion a year seems a conservative
estimate.
Table 7. Total Population and Share in the U.S. for Selected Latin American Countries, 2015.
Country

Total Population

Population of this Origin in the U.S.

Mexico
127,017,224
35,797,080
Colombia
48,228,704
1,081,838
Peru
31,376,670
646,395
Guatemala
16,342,897
1,377,500
Ecuador
16,144,363
712,084
Cuba
11,389,562
2,106,501
Dominican Republic
10,528,391
1,873,097
El Salvador
6,126,583
2,171,894
Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank (2017) and U.S. Census Bureau (2016) data.

Ad Hoc Estimate
As discussed above, through a securitization transaction the originator pledges future receipts
expected over a number of years. That way the issuer can raise funds in capital markets that are
multiple times higher than one year’s worth of receivables. A World Bank primer on leveraging
innovative finance techniques for development (Ketkar and Ratha 2009) offers a simple method
for calculating the potential issuance of future-flow backed securities, taking into consideration
the different risks that credit agencies judge. The point of deriving this potential, however, “is
not to forecast, but to obtain a benchmark against which the severity of constraints on such
issuance could be gauged,” according to Ketkar and Ratha (2009, 36).
The calculation is based on two assumptions, that only a share of the total remittance inflows
can be successfully attracted through the banking system and that the total debt issued is backed
by several times that amount. As explained in Chapter 3, the securitization transaction would
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issue the rights to only a portion of expected remittance inflows, that way if remittance receipts
are lower than expected the extra collateral is available to cover the difference. In other words,
overcollateralization is a way of credit enhancement by reducing the performance and volume
volatility risks, while the very own structure of the securitization mitigates the convertibility
and transfer risks associated with lending to developing countries.
Table 8 below shows several estimates for variations in the assumptions above; that is, for
different levels of success in capturing remittances through the banking system and different
overcollateralization ratios—based on the ad hoc $2.0 billion a year estimate of remittance
inflows at which we arrived in the previous section.
For example, if we assume that only half of the yearly inflows are successfully channeled
through the banks, we are left with $1.0 billion to be used for securitization. Next we apply an
overcollateralization ratio of (e.g.) 5:1—i.e. that every $1 of debt issued is backed by $5 of
expected receipts—and we obtain a potential issuance of remittance-backed debt of $200
million a year. In this example the 5:1 overcollateralization ratio means that remittance inflows
would have to come short of expectations by 80 percent in order to jeopardize the ability of the
SPV to service the principal and interest payments.
Table 8. Potential Yearly Remittance-Backed Securitization for Different Levels of Official
Inflows and Overcollateralization Ratios. (US$ millions)
Overcollateralization ratio

Share of remittances through the banking system
25 percent
50 percent
75 percent

3:1

166.7

333.3

500.0

5:1

100.0

200.0

300.0

7:1

71.4

142.9

214.3

10:1
50.0
Source: Author’s calculations, see text.

100.0

150.0

A Note on Monetary Sovereignty
In short, the taxes-drive-money approach—more extensively discussed elsewhere; e.g. Innes
(1913), Kelton ([Bell] 2001), Tcherneva (2005), Wray (2012)—explains that governments first
create a money of account and then create a demand for it by imposing taxes, fines, and other
obligations in the national money of account. As Wray (2012, 50) puts it, “[i]n all modern
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nations this is sufficient to ensure that many (indeed, most) debts, assets, and prices will also be
denominated in the national money of account.” The government then proceeds to issue a
currency denominated in that same money of account, provided it always accepts payments in
such currency.
In a highly centralized, command economy like the Cuban, the government can always ensure
there is a demand for its fiat currency(ies)—even when they have no intrinsic value—because it
is easier to enforce the legal tender laws than in a market economy dominated by private actors.
Moreover, in Cuba, where private enterprise is extremely limited to a few services, virtually all
transactions and payments (in addition to taxes and fines) are with the government, who has a
monopoly on almost all resources needed in everyday life. Since the government can always
dictate which currency it will accept in payments to itself, it thus guarantees a constant demand
for its currencies.
The Cuban economy has been operating under a dual-currency system since the partial
dollarization of the economy that took place after the economic depression of the early 1990s.
American dollars (USD), mainly remitted by Cuban-Americans, began circulating in the
underground economy and black-market as a consequence of the devaluation of the Cuban peso
(CUP) and the hyperinflationary episode that followed. In 1993 the government legalized the
circulation and use of USDs in the national economy, and from then forward both the CUP and
the USD functioned as means of payments and unit of account. However, after the economy
recovered from the depression and macroeconomic indicators stabilized, the government
implemented a series of measures that by 2004 had substituted the functions of the USD by a
third currency (that had already been in circulation, although marginally)—the Cuban
Convertible (CUC) (Vidal and Pérez 2013). Thus, today the country has adopted its own
monies of account and the government is the sole issuer of the two currencies denominated in
those units of account. This allows the government, acting through its central and commercial
banks, to always be able to make good on its obligations in the domestic markets that transact
in those same currencies.6

6

Concerns over inflation might limit such ability, in practice. Too much money in circulation chasing after too few
goods and services might drive prices up, especially in an economy like the Cuban, where typically there are
shortages of goods and services. This is likely one of the concerns that drove the government to start financing its
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Understanding that the Cuban government—as the monopoly issuer of the fiat-currencies—
does not face any financial constraints to fund its operations in the domestic markets that
transact in those same currencies is crucial to answer the question: how can banks create
demand deposits for remittance recipients if the remittance dollars (e.g.) are directed to an
offshore trust?
The short answer to this question is that banks create demand deposits in CUP/CUC by simply
crediting the remittance-recipient account. The banking system is not different to an “electronic
scoreboard” system, in the words of Wray (2012, 60-61), in the sense that the banks can never
run out of credits, no more than they can run out of keystrokes. However, even though banks
create deposits ex nihilo—i.e. out of nothing—they still need to maintain the reserve
requirements established by Central Bank regulations.7
The Role of the Interbank Market
It seems that the Cuban government realized that having excess reserves parked is costly for
banks and as part of the recent economic reforms a resolution was passed establishing an
interbank market where banks can more efficiently manage the reserves held in their balance
sheets (see BCC’s Resolution No. 91 2011). Resolution No. 91/2011 indicates that banks
participate directly in the interbank market, as lenders or borrowers of funds, by establishing
reciprocal accounts or through the Real-Time Gross Settlement system, using their accounts at
the Central Bank. The Resolution also directs the BCC to monitor, organize, and regulate this
market through direct and indirect interventions.
Later on the government determined that starting in 2014 a fraction of the fiscal deficit would
be financed by the emission of sovereign bonds. These bonds are to be purchased by the
commercial banks as an interest-bearing alternative to their excess reserves and could be used
as a debt instrument in the interbank market (González García and Lage Codorníu 2017).8
This new interbank market would play a central role complementing the remittance
securitization transaction by allowing commercial banks to secure the reserves they need to
deficit by emitting sovereign bonds to be bought using reserves sitting in the banks instead of by letting the BCC
finance it through primary money emissions (Gónzalez García and Lage Codorníu 2017).
7
According to the Central Bank of Cuba’s official webpage, currently the reserve requirements are 10 percent for
national currency and 5.5 percent for foreign (see “Encaje” 2017).
8
The rest of the deficit will continue to be monetized in coordination with the Central Bank.

35

comply with the reserves ratios required by monetary policy regulators. In other words, the
banks can create the demand deposits for remittance-receivers regardless of the amount of
reserves they hold and then just turn to the interbank market to find any amount of reserves they
need as a requirement. Moreover, not only the creation of demand deposits is not constrained
by the quantity of reserves held by a particular bank, but it is also not a function of the reserves
held by the entire banking system, for that matter. This is because the Central Bank will
ultimately accommodate the demand for reserves to narrow the fluctuations of the interest rate
in the interbank market, which is to be agreed upon between commercial banks (BCC
Resolution No. 91 2011).
Resolution No. 91 (BCC 2011), governing the interbank market, allows the Central Bank to
participate through a number of direct and indirect tools. The policy kit includes open market
operations and the intervention through two interest rates that effectively allow the monetary
policy committee to operate an interest rate corridor system in the interbank market. The ceiling
rate is set by the BCC’s permanent credit service,9 through which commercial banks can
borrow any amount they need in the short term—typically overnight10—at a fixed Lombard
rate. While the lower bound is set by the interest rate paid to the banks on reserves deposited at
the BCC when they buy public debt from the central bank. Ultimately, the BCC can act as
lender of last resort (LOLR) at a discount rate (see BCC’s Resolution No. 33 2010) for any
particular or systematic liquidity problems in the banking system—and, as explained above, is
not financially constrained in its ability to inject reserves (in the national currencies) into the
system.
To summarize this section, the language in the Resolution establishing the interbank market
(Resolution No. 91/2011) and in the BCC’s memorandum setting its interest rates in this market
(see BCC Circular No. 2/2012) indicates a reluctance of monetary authorities to primary
monetary emission. This can also be interpreted by the way in which the interest rate corridor
system works, encouraging banks to lend/ borrow reserves amongst themselves (Pérez Soto and
Lage Codorníu 2012). Thus, commercial banks are directed to the interbank market as a first
option when they need reserves, before liquidating any assets or accessing the credit services of

9

An automatic overdraft on bank’s checking accounts at the BCC.
Similar to the Federal Reserve’s discount window.

10
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the BCC. And, the monetary authorities expect the BCC to play the role of LOLR only when all
other alternatives have been exhausted, in order to avoid primary emission of money.
The short answer to the question formulated at the end of the previous section—regarding the
ability of banks to create demand deposit for remittance recipients—now becomes longer:
Banks create demand deposits ex nihilo in CUP/CUC by simply crediting the remittancerecipient account and adjust their excess reserves to comply with the required reserve ratios.
Banks continue to create demand deposits even if they run out of reserves, at which point they
are mandated to turn to the recently created interbank market to procure the reserves. If the
interbank market cannot provide the reserves in demand this will bid up the interbank rate and
the BCC will step in to maintain its target interest rate. As we have seen before, the BCC’s
policy kit includes buying government debt from the banks in the open market, offering a short
term permanent credit service, and acting as the ultimate credit creator through its LOLR
faculties.
An alternative way to interpret the process described above is that under the remittance
securitization banks would be buying dollars from remittance recipients in a similar manner to
how they already do on the spot—i.e. accepting dollars and offering the equivalent cash amount
of CUP/CUC. The difference is that with the securitization transaction the banks in Cuba
purchase the foreign currency directly from the originators of remittances, before the hard
currency enters the national territory, in exchange for the promise of delivering the recipient the
required amount of national currency. As argued above, the foreign currency is directed to an
offshore escrow account, which is necessary to mitigate the transfer and convertibility risks
associated with lending to developing nations.
Finally, while transfer and convertibility risks are important components of sovereign risk,
credit rating agencies consider other elements, such as diversion risk—i.e. the risk that changes
in government policies might disrupt the payments sent to the offshore trust or central bank
interferences with capital controls. Ketkar & Ratha (2009) argue that central banks in countries
like Brazil and Mexico, for example, have recognized the advantages of securitized borrowing
and therefore do not implement policies that disrupt the transactions. To reduce this type of
country risk private banks typically strike agreements with the central banks to guarantee, as
much as possible, that the central bank would not intervene to disrupt the operation. What is
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important to notice here is that in the particular case of Cuba, since the banks are state owned,
the securitization in itself would be a state ran operation ran and orchestrated in coordination
with the BCC. Thus the risks that the state or the central bank would take steps that disrupt its
own transaction, inducing a self-inflicted default on its securitize debt, is significantly lower
than in private banks’ securitizations.
Challenges to Channeling Remittances through the Banking System
The use of this innovative source of financing in the context of Cuba can be seen as a twofold
problem. First, the country needs to implement a series of macroeconomic policies that would
channel a larger share of remittances through the banking system. Then, assuming the
securitization has successfully been carried out and the future flows sold to investors, the
government needs to decide where best to direct the revenues. The following sections analyze
the challenges and limitations to funneling remittances through Cuban official channels, and
then argue how this tool fits within current structures and institutions of the Cuban economy.
A major obstacle to a FFS transaction backed by remittances flows in Cuba is precisely
channeling large enough inflows through the national banking system that would make issuing
the debt instrument a viable alternative. According to surveys conducted in Cuba and in the
U.S., around half of the remittances sent to the island arrive via friends or the so-called
“mules”11 (Orozco 2009; Diaz-Brisquets 2008). Thus, the biggest challenge to the
implementation of a remittances-backed instrument would be reducing the use of unofficial
channels.
The use of mules to routinely carry money and goods to the island is extremely popular because
it offers benefits to both the remitter and the recipient. The most important of which are that
they charge cheaper fees than formal transfer services, avoid bureaucratic procedures or legal
requirements, offer home delivery services and option to withdraw funds almost immediately
after money has been deposited, and have established cross-border trust (Eckstein 2004). While
the larger part of remitters use these informal channels, some still use wire services—e.g.
Western Union has over 400 locations in Cuba—even though they charge higher fees and they
require senders to fill out affidavits to comply with Embargo laws.
11

Is the term commonly used to refer to unlicensed remittance carriers.

38

It should be noted, however, that the use—even extensive use—of informal channels to send
monies back to home countries is not limited to Cuba. According to the World Bank (2005), the
official amount of remittance flows to developing country could be underestimated by close to
half.
The use of informal channels responds to four main reasons. First, there is an evident lack of
banking infrastructure and a really backward/primitive financial culture. Only a very small
percentage of the Cuban population has checking, savings accounts and even smaller
percentage have something similar to a debit card. Banks do not emit credit cards for the
general public. Second, the costs are considerably lower when using mules than any of the
formal systems, whether is a bank or money order like Western Union. As shown in the Table 9
below, Cuba has the highest average and total costs for sending remittances among countries of
the area.
Table 9. Cost of Sending $200 in Remittances from U.S. to Selected Area Countries. (4th Q2016
averages)
No. Of
Firms

Access Points for Senders

Receiving
Methods

Average
Fee (US$)

Total Cost
(percent)

Total Cost
(US$)

Dominican
Republic

10

Agent, Internet, Bank
Branch

Home delivery,
Agent, Bank
Account Transfer

8.99

6.14

12.28

Ecuador

10

Agent, Internet, Bank
Branch

Agent, Bank
Account Transfer

7.22

3.61

7.22

El Salvador

11

Agent, Internet, Bank
Branch, Call Center

Home delivery,
Agent, Bank
Account Transfer,
Bank Branch

8.45

4.23

8.45

Honduras

6

Agent, Internet

Agent, Bank
Account Transfer

8.55

3.54

7.07

Brazil

8

Agent, Internet

Agent, Bank
Account Transfer

7.12

7.84

15.69

Cuba

1

Agent, Internet

Agent

16

10.92

21.84

Country

Source: Author’s elaboration from World Bank’s data (see “Remittance Prices Worldwide” 2017).12

The third reason is trust; there is a general lack of trust in the government. Not only have mules
won the trust and confidence of the remittance senders and receivers, but there seems to be a
general lack of trust in the ability of the Cuban government to deliver hard currencies at
12

It should be pointed out that the World Bank lacks data on a number of other firms participating in the Cuban
remittance markets, as explained in previous chapters.
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request, especially since the central bank has imposed capital controls in several occasions in
the past (Vidal and Pérez 2013).
Finally, the sanctions from violating the U.S. embargo against Cuba impose limitations and
restrictions on the use of conventional financial canals; pushing financial transactions, from
which the Cuban government could potentially profit, to informal channels.
Responding to the Challenges Noted Above
Policy of Incentives
A number of countries have attempted, and failed, to capture remittances by directly taxing
these flows. This can be counter-productive if the intended policy is to promote the use of
formal channels because taxing remittances incentivizes and increases the use of informal
channels (Agunias 2006; Hagen-Zanker 2014).
Instead, some countries have found that offering tax breaks and premium exchange rates—to
both receivers and senders—is a more effective incentive to direct remittances through formal
channels as well as to stimulate the total amount of inflows. As Agunias (2006) argues, a
“carrots rather than sticks”-policy seems to be the most common approach to this end. A World
Bank survey of central banks in forty developing countries finds that 35 percent of those
countries grant migrants special incentives to send money back home. Those incentives include,
tax breaks, higher interest rates for deposits, and preferential prices for land purchases (de Luna
Martínez 2005).
Other than Tax Breaks
Another alternative is offering certificates carrying interest rates above what the government
pays for saving deposits; i.e. a premium interest rate. Some countries, like Bangladesh, India,
and Tunisia, have experimented with special types of deposit accounts at preferential interest
rates (Agunias 2006). Other financial products, like savings packages or pension funds can also
be made attractive by exempting, to some degree, interest from taxation when they are funded
by remittances.
Reducing Costs and Fees
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While the above mentioned represent an effort from the home country to indirectly ameliorate
the costs of sending remittances, reducing transfer costs seems to be a decisive factor. Existing
evidence reviewed by Yang (2011) suggests that the number of remittance transfers and the
amounts sent can be highly susceptible to costs and fees reductions. Additionally, Freund and
Spatafora’s data (2008) shows that transaction costs are negatively correlated with total flows
of remittances at the country level, indicating that high transaction fees restrain migrants from
sending money home or push them to remit through informal channels.
One observed element that influences costs is competition. As Orozco (2002, 1) argues,
“remittances appear less costly when competition is greater.” Indeed, a World Bank study
across 119 countries finds that remittance corridors with greater competition among providers
are associated with lower remittance prices (Beck and Martínez Pería 2011). Competition has
the added benefit of improving the quality of the service in terms of reliability and the times it
takes to complete a transaction. As noted by Yang (2011, 146), policies that “increase
competition in money transmission markets or improvements in information for migrants on the
relative costs of different money transmission services” can have large impacts on future
remittance flows. These claims are in line with the findings in Watkins and Quattri (2014)
suggesting that lack of competition, market power concentration contribute to high remittance
charges. Indeed, according to Wimaladharma, Pearce, and Stanton (2004) the cost of sending
remittances decreased by half in five years as a result of increased competition in the U.S.Mexico corridor.
Unfortunately, as illustrated in Table 9 above, competition in the formal channels in Cuba is
extremely limited. Thus, Cuba stands to benefit from potential significantly lower transaction
costs, with the entrance of additional banks and money-transfer agencies in its remittance
market.
Moreover, reducing or eliminating altogether the current 10 percent surcharge on USD cash
exchange would also lower de facto costs, helping flush-out additional hard currency from the
informal channels and into the national financial system.
In a way, the Cuban government seems implicitly committed to lowering remittance transfer
costs. This is because the reduction of remittance costs is a strategic target of the United
Nations 17 Sustainable Development Goals (see “Sustainable Development Goals).
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Specifically, Goal number 10, “Reduce inequality within and among countries,” includes the
specific target of “reduc[ing] to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant
remittances,” by 2030. The fact that the Cuban government is committed to achieving these
Goals (Acosta 2015) allows us to expect future policies aimed at lowering transfer costs.
Technology
New technologies can have an important role to play as an alternative to the lack of financial
infrastructure in the country. Especially relevant would be extending internet and mobile
services to the whole population; services that are extremely restricted in Cuba. The extensive
use of these services would open the door to a currently excluded large part of the population,
including many in remote, rural areas. Building upon current structures to improve internet and
mobile banking can help bypass the construction of a costly network of banks, branches,
ATMs, etc. Examples of this type are the M-Pesa project between Kenya and the U.K., and the
G-Cash system offered by Globe Telecom in the Philippines (Agunias 2006). These services
allow remitters to send money via mobile phone. Extending banking services and financial
culture to the unbanked can make those people more likely to use these services for remittancereceiving purposes than before.
Moreover, digital remittances—particularly mobile—are estimated to significantly reduce
transfer costs. A report by Ahmed, McDaniel, and Schropp (2016) compares the costs of
sending remittances via digital platforms Xoom and PayPal13 with World Bank data on
traditional remittances prices—e.g. bank accounts, money transfer operators, nonbank financial
institutions. The researchers find digital remittances to be an average 3.5 percentage points
cheaper than the World Bank data, 3.93 and 7.45 percent respectively. Their findings seem to
be in line with other studies of this type that have found mobile remittances to be on average
around 50 percent cheaper than using money transfer operators (Farooq, Naghavi, and
Scharwatt 2016).
There are a number of advantages that help explain the lower costs of digital remittances—e.g.
the reach and speed in which these transactions are completed, taking only a few taps on a

13

PayPal is an American company operating a worldwide internet payments platform with around 188 million user
accounts in more than 200 markets. Xoom is a PayPal service to make it easier to send money across countries
(Ahmed, McDaniel, and Schropp 2016).
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phone and only seconds to send remittances from across the world; or the 24 hours availability,
as opposed to physical locations that have working hours (Ahmed, McDaniel, and Schropp
2016; Farooq, Naghavi, and Scharwatt 2016). Additionally, because digital remittances are
linked to a bank account the service offers the security of not having to carry large sums of cash
from/to a bank branch or agency. Digital remittance services also increase competition among
providers, a key factor mentioned above.
The Issue of Trust
Finally, the trustworthiness issue is one that needs time to be overcome. A crisis of confidence
creates disincentives for foreign currency to enter the country through the banking system.
People can always choose to accumulate their savings physically in international currency, for
the security it might offer in an uncertain environment of economic reforms. However, a good
starting point is for the government to reverse this crisis of confidence to maintain or even
accelerate the pace of the process of “updating” of the economic model and the reforms
contained in the Guidelines. By making good on its promises and plans the government would
be offering some assurance of its commitment to a specific policy—a sort of “forward
guidance,” à-la Fed. In this case, remittance senders and recipients would need to be convinced
that moneys sent through the Cuban banking system would find its destination in a safe, timely
manner.
Interplay of the Remittance Securitization in the Cuban Economy
The two main advantages securitization offers developing countries is that it allows to break
with the sovereign credit ceiling—opening the door to debt financing at better terms—and that
it allows to cash-in “today” the revenues expected over a number of future periods. So what to
do with the millions of foreign currency potentially to be raised through the remittance
securitization? In this section we suggest three key elements in the Cuban economy that stand
to benefit from which finding new sources of external finance is imperative.
Finance for Development
The most obvious use to the funds raised through a remittance securitization would be to
leverage them for expensive capital or development projects. This is precisely the premise of
Ketkar and Ratha (2009, 1), who argue that “lacking credit history, and given the perception by
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investors that investments in these countries can be risky, developing countries need innovative
financing mechanisms.”
Recently, renowned Cuban economist Pedro Monreal has called attention to an investment gap
of close to CUP10 billion needed get the economy growing at rates compatible with the
national plan for economic development (Monreal 2016, 2017b). Thus the remittance
securitization stands as a prospective mechanism to close a large part of the funding gap for
development (see Table 8).
Debt Repayment
As argued in Chapter 1, Cuba is facing an international environment favorable to improving its
external creditworthiness. To this end, one of the most important factors will be the timely
fulfillment of the current debt obligations. However, while the political willingness to honor
debt commitments seems to be there, as President Castro has repeatedly promised in recent
speeches (Castro 2015), the ability to generate hard currency receipts to meet the new outflows
might be lacking.
Given the hard currency constraints under which Cuba operates, it is hard to guess what will be
the source of funds for the servicing of the debt; especially since virtually no debt payments
have taken place in past years. Then the question arises about the appropriateness of redirecting
funds that were being used in other activities and assign them for the debt repayment. This
would be tantamount to an austerity policy while the economy just entered a recession at the
end of 2016.
In this context we see a space for the securitization operation. In the example used above, the
remittance securitization could potentially—and conservatively—raise some $200 million a
year. Due the lack of information on contractual agreements we do not know precisely how the
debt service is scheduled, but given that the first payment to the Paris Club creditors was for
$41 million, a securitization transaction in the middle of Table 8 could raise several years’
worth of those payments.
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Monetary Reform
The Guidelines constituting the Communist Party’s platform for economic and social policies
declares a much needed monetary reform as one of the government’s top priorities. The
monetary reform—which has been predicted, planned, and postponed several times in the
past—seems imminent as Raúl Castro approaches the end of his (self-imposed) presidential
term.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, for over two decades the Cuban economy has been
operating under a dual-currency, -exchange rate system (see table 10 below). The coexistence
of two currencies with different exchange rates introduces a number of economic, efficiency,
and accounting distortions that some economists have called “the Achilles’ heel” of the current
process of modernizing the economic system in Cuba (Amuchástegui 2014, 176).
Table 10. Different Exchange Rates for CUP and CUC, 2015.
Population and Tourists
(in currency exchange
houses)

Firms and Public
Institutions

Cuban Peso/Cuban Convertible

24.0

1.0

Cuban Convertible/U.S. Dollar

1.0*

1.0

Cuban Peso/U.S. Dollar

24.0

1.0

Currency Pair

*An additional 10 percent tax is imposed on USD cash exchanges.
Source: Author’s elaboration from Office of National Statistics’ data (ONEI 2015).

Some of the distortions mentioned above are described in The Economist as,
a bizarre anomaly in Cuban accounting, whereby state companies pretend in their
balance sheets and domestic trading books that one CUP equals one CUC. The practice
has prevented CUP inflation. But it has made imports seem artificially cheap
and exports unprofitable. It also obfuscated inefficiencies that plague Cuba’s
predominantly state-owned businesses. (The Economist 2013)
The literature surrounding this issue argues that one of the most important policy measures to
be introduced to solve the parallel circulation of two currencies is the devaluation of the
exchange rate of the Cuban peso (Vidal and Pérez 2013; Amuchástegui 2014; de la Torre and
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Ize 2014), which is the currency expected to remain after the unification.14 There seems to be a
consensus from both government officials and economists about the need for devaluation of the
CUP (Vidal and Pérez 2013); which has been called the “backbone of the unification process”
(Amuchástegui 2014, 180).
The reforms are usually discussed in the context of whether the depreciation should be a bigbang kind of shock or if the government should implement a gradual depreciation, either by
sectors or globally and with or without subsidies to state companies that would suddenly
become less competitive (Vidal and Pérez 2013; Amuchástegui 2014; de la Torre and Ize
2014). Indeed, Pavel Vidal, a former monetary policy specialist from the BCC, regularly refers
to the devaluation as the single most important measure to be implemented in this process
(2009, 2012; Vidal and Pérez 2013). And, moreover, the authors argue that the unification
process must be complemented or cushioned by fiscal policy that “absorbs the effects of the
eventual devaluation” (Vidal and Brown 2015, endnote no.3, 20).
Vidal and Brown (2015) seem to suggest that the funds for these cushions could be secured
from international organizations like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank acting
as hard-currency lenders of last resort; for which they recommend previously Cuba join those
institutions. While other authors suggest that foreign exchange reserves and a healthy fiscal
surplus would facilitate the unification, but do not argue how to arrive at either of those (de la
Torre and Ize 2014). In this context, we propose the remittance securitization as a vehicle that
could potentially raise important amounts of foreign currency reserves to be used as the fiscal
cushion needed for the monetary reform.

14

According to Amuchástegui (2014) government officials have been quoted in the official newspaper of the
Communist Party stating that it is imperative to restore the money functions of the Cuban peso—that is, as unit of
account, means of payment and store of value.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

The scarcity of foreign currency in the hands of the government jeopardizes the economic and
social development of the nation, in general, and, in particular, the ability of the leadership to
successfully restructure, revitalize, and “update” the economy, while escaping a looming
recessionary episode and fulfilling external debt commitments. There currently exists a
substantial inflow of this much needed foreign exchange in the form of remittances.
Remittances are a mostly untapped source of external financing, which can be leveraged
through innovative financing mechanisms. We set out to examine one of such mechanisms—
remittance securitization.
The financial reforms undertaken in Cuba since the 1990s, including the country’s use of its
moneys of account and the interbank market, create a sufficient financial infrastructure to
structure a remittance securitization operation. We have identified the financial institution under
whose umbrella of responsibilities the financialization of assets can be done, and we have
identified how the securitization plays out and complements the newly created interbank market
for reserves and public debt. In short, the Cuban commercial banks are sitting on piles of excess
of reserves for which they have little use, which seems to have been an important determinant
in the recent decision to use those reserves to fund the fiscal deficits (González García and Lage
Codorníu 2017). These reserves can be used as the first option to maintain the reserve ratios,
after a bank pays remittance-receivers the required amounts in local currency. If a bank is short
of reserves, it can find the funds it needs to maintain the reserve requirements in the interbank
market. The central bank will step-in through a number of policy tools discussed above,
including open market operations, to maintain the liquidity in the system that corresponds to the
desired interest rate in this market. And, as discussed above, the monetary sovereignty allows
the BCC to always be able to maintain liquidity in the system and to act as lender of last resort,
in the national moneys of account.
In Table 8 we show some benchmark amounts—again, not a forecast—that could potentially be
raised with remittance-backed securities, depending on a couple of assumptions. The
securitizations of expected revenue streams are structured to significantly reduce developing
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countries’ transfer and convertibility risks. This is done by directing the future foreign currency
inflows to an offshore account, keeping the receivables outside the borrowing country until
investors have received their interest and principal payments. Other remaining risks considered
by credit rating agencies—e.g. product, diversion—would also be largely mitigated for the
particular case of a Cuban remittance securitization. The product risk, associated with the
volume of receivables, is lessened by the large and growing yearly remittance flows to the
island. While the risks that either the government or the central bank would take steps to disrupt
its own operation—i.e. diversion risk—is significantly lower than in this case vis-à-vis private
banks’ securitizations. Overcoming the performance risk, which is associated with the ability of
the debt-issuing institution to generate the receivables, can be the most challenging issue, as it
applies to the ability of the Cuban government to direct remittances through their banking
system and out of the informal channels. To overcome this issue we made a series of policy
recommendations that aim at strengthening the financial infrastructure and make banks more
attractive to remitters than informal channels.
We argued that those characteristics of the securitization structure allow breaking with the
country credit rating, potentially leading to improved credit scores and hence better terms on
the debt—which would result in lower interest rates and longer terms. However, estimating the
precise rating the securities could score is out of the scope of this paper. Rating agencies
usually maintain confidential the rating methodologies they employ. Their scores also carry a
large weight of subjective judgment of their analysts and their variables do not carry the same
weight depending on the country; which means that there is no exact model to apply to all
countries.
As explained in Chapter 3, the re-emergence of inequalities long thought to have been
eliminated by the Revolution is to a great extent a reflection of the unequal access to
remittances by different sectors of the population. However, as Espina (2005) argues, creating a
more egalitarian Cuban society does not necessarily mean going back to the pre-1990s crisis
model, but to implement and exploit available alternatives for economic and social policies that
create more equalizing outcomes. The securitization of remittances can indirectly become one
of such alternatives by democratizing these otherwise private flows; providing the government
with funds that can be directed to economic, social policies and projects that ameliorate the
inequality bias of remittances. From this perspective, the securitization of remittances would be
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an especially attractive policy for the government to reduce socio-economic disparities in the
Cuban society. This is of the utmost importance for the government considering that inequality
is, arguably, a sufficient condition for the failure of fifty years of a Revolutionary project that
has strongly tied its legitimacy to outcomes of socio-economic equality.
Finally, the arguments developed here and the suggestions should be taken as a first
approximation from where to extend further impact, pros, and cons of a potential remittance
securitization. Prudence and caution should be exercised when resorting to debt finance in order
to avoid excessive debt burden, the dangers of which have been extensively demonstrated both
empirically and theoretically. Moreover, cashing-in as a lump sum today the future receipts
over a number of years, can also have implications regarding future fiscal flexibility. By
committing the future stream of remittance inflows to service the principal and interest
payments from the securitization, the government is effectively earmarking future resources
under its budget, limiting its flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. These are issues for
government officials to consider when adjusting their budgetary decisions and the composition
of their balance sheets.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Evolution of selected macroeconomic indicators in the Cuban economy, 2000-2015.
2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Millions of CUP (constant 1997 prices)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

28,574.3

29,484.4

29,904.4

Components of GDP:
Private Consumption
Government Consumption
Gross Capital Formation
Exports of Goods and Services
Imports of Goods and Services
Other Macroeconomics Indicators:
Fiscal Deficit
External Debt
GDP annual growth rate (constant 1997 prices)
Consumer Price Index (annual change)
Unemployment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate

31,038.6

32,829.8 36,507.3 40,912.2 43,883.3 45,689.9

Percent of GDP (at constant 1997 prices)
59.3
25.8
13.2
18.0
16.4

59.7
25.9
12.9
16.8
15.3

60.1
26.5
11.4
16.0
14.0

61.5
27.4
9.9
16.3
15.1

59.0
28.2
10.6
18.3
16.1

53.3
28.0
12.7
24.3
18.2

56.4
26.9
14.3
22.0
19.6

53.4
27.7
13.6
23.3
18.1

50.4
27.3
15.9
25.0
18.6

-2.2

-2.3

-3.0

-3.0

-3.7
15.2
Percent

-4.6
13.8

-3.2
14.8

-3.2
15.2

-6.9
19.1

3.8

5.8
3.0
1.9
71.0

11.2
3.7
1.9
72.1

12.1
5.7
1.9
72.1

7.3
2.8
1.8
73.7

4.1
-0.1
1.6
74.7

.

.
5.9

.

.
3.2

.
5.4
69.9

.
1.4

.
4.1
70.7

.
3.3
70.9

2.3
70.9

(Table continues in following page)
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(Continuation from previous page)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Millions of CUP (constant 1997 prices)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
Components of GDP:
Private Consumption
Government Consumption
Gross Capital Formation
Exports of Goods and Services
Imports of Goods and Services
Other Macroeconomics Indicators:
Fiscal Deficit
External Debt
GDP annual growth rate (constant 1997 prices)
Consumer Price Index (annual change)
Unemployment Rate
Labor Force Participation Rate

46,353.0

47,461.0

48,791.0

50,262.0

51,643.0 52,184.0 54,500.1

50.1
27.4
12.7
25.4
15.6

Percent of GDP (at constant 1997 prices)
52.8
52.1
52.2
53.4
27.3
26.3
25.4
24.9
12.3
13.0
13.6
13.7
28.2
29.0
28.2
28.0
20.7
20.4
19.3
20.0

-4.9
19.8

-3.6
21.1

-1.7
20.2

-3.7
17.1

-1.3
15.4

2.4
1.6
2.5
74.9

Percent
2.8
3.0
3.6
2.0
3.2
3.5
76.1
74.2

2.7
0.6
3.3
72.9

1.4
-0.1
1.7
75.4

Source: Author’s elaboration from Office of National Statistics and Information data (ONEI various years).
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55.3
24.4
12.9
26.9
19.5

56.8
23.3
14.6
25.7
20.5

-2.2

-5.8

.

.
1.0
2.1
2.7
71.9

4.4
2.8
2.4
69.1

APPENDIX B
According to information available in Banco Central de Cuba’s website, the national banking
system is constituted by 9 commercial banks, 15 non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), 11
representation offices of foreign banks, and 4 representation offices of non-bank financial
institutions. Among them are the following:
Table A2. List of Financial Institutions in Cuba.
Cuban commercial banks
Banco Nacional de Cuba

Country
Cuba

Banco Popular de Ahorro

Cuba

Banco de Inversiones S.A.

Cuba

Banco Metropolitano S.A.

Cuba

Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A.

Cuba

Banco Financiero Internacional S.A.

Cuba

Banco de Crédito y Comercio

Cuba

Banco Exterior de Cuba

Cuba

Banco Industrial de Venezuela Cuba S.A.

Cuba & Venezuela

Cuban NBFI

Country

Grupo Nueva Banca S.A.

Cuba

Compañía Fiduciaria S.A.

Cuba

RAFIN S.A.

Cuba

FIMEL S.A.

Cuba

CADECA S.A.

Cuba

Corporación Financiera Habana S.A.

Cuba

Financiera Cimex S.A.

Cuba

Financiera para el Turismo S.A.

Cuba

Financiera Iberoamericana S.A.

Cuba, Banco de Sabadell

Compañía Financiera S.A.

Cuba

Azucarera S.A.

Cuba

FINTUR S.A.

Cuba

Servicios de Pago de Red S.A.

Cuba

FINEXIM S.A.

Cuba
(Table continues in following page)
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(Continuation from previous page)
Foreign banks with representation offices in Cuba

Country

Havin International Bank Ltd.

UK

National Bank of Canada

Canada

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. (BBVA)

Spain

Banco Sabadell S.A.

Spain

Bankia S.A.

Spain

Fransabank Group

Lebanon

Republic Bank Ltd.

Trinidad and Tobago

BPCE International et Outre- mer (BPCE IOM)

France

Scotiabank (The Bank of Nova Scotia)

Canada

NBFIs with representation offices in Cuba

Country

Fincomex Limited

UK

Novafin Financiere S.A.

Switzerland

Caribbean Tulip Finance Inc

British Virgin Islands

Source: Banco Central de Cuba (see “Sistema Bancario” [Banking System] 2017).
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